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TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO AUDIO-VISUAL
COVERAGE AND RECORDINGS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
Daniel Stepniak'

INTRODUCTION

Courts worldwide increasingly utilise the latest information and
communications technology to enhance the efficiency ofjudicial administration and
the conduct of court proceedings.' Yet many judges and court administrators
remain far less enthusiastic about employing or permitting the latest technology to
be used to facilitate public access to recordings or audio-visual coverage of court
proceedings.!
The regulation of court reporting calls for a balancing of the right to a fair trial
with the benefits flowing from the open and publicised administration of justice.
Yet, merely leaving courtroom doors open to the public is undoubtedly grossly
inadequate as a means of ensuring openness, let alone the publicity required for
justice not only to be done, but also be seen to be done. It has long been recognised
that the media act as surrogates for the public through its presence in court and
scrutiny of judicial proceedings. 3 The attainment of the benefits of open justice
hinges on such publication of court proceedings as would permit members of the
public to acquire an understanding and form independent and informed views of the
manner in which justice is administered on their behalf. While innovations in
broadcasting and information technologies make such publicity increasingly
possible and no longer dependent on media interest, broadcasters' abuses of access
to courts, and increasingly, difficult experiences in endeavouring to regulate the use
* Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia. In this article the author expands on
issues he addressed at the Courtroom 21 International Conference on the Legal and Policy
Implications of Courtroom Technology. He congratulates and thanks the conference
organizers, and wishes to express his appreciation to the conference participants for their
invaluable comments and insights, to this journal's editors for their fastidious work, and to
everyone who assisted in his research.
' On the extent to which technology permeates the judicial process, see Bob Debus,
Technology in the Courts, N.S.W. LAw Soc'Y J., Mar. 2001, at 67.
2 This contrast is explored in Bernard League, Access to the Courtsand Its Implications,
1 U. OF TECH. SYDNEY L. REv. 112, 112-14, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
joumals/UTSLR/1999/19.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980); see also
Harman v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [1983] A.C. 280, 316; Edmonton Journal v.
Alberta, 2 S.C.R. 1326, 1340 (1989); R v. Liddel, 1 N.Z.L.R. 538, 540 (1995).
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of technologies that transcend jurisdictions, leave many concerned that such
coverage is not in the interests of the administration of justice.'
In the hope of promoting an overdue discussion, I seek to set out a number of
legal and policy implications of the utilisation of audio-visual broadcasting and
information technology to broadcast and record judicial proceedings. My analysis
leads me to suggest that in order to address existing concerns and yet attain the
benefits of an unprecedented level of public access in audio-visual coverage and
recording of judicial proceedings, there is a need to consider why we value and
insist on the public administration ofj ustice, and whether the implementation of the
principle of open justice needs to be reconsidered in light of contemporary
techniques of broadcasting and dissemination of public information. In so doing I
put forward some suggestions as to how technology that permits greater public
access may be utilised to promote, rather than frustrate, the administration of
justice.
I. BANNING THE USE OF EARLY AUDIO-VISUAL TECHNOLOGY

IN COURT REPORTING

Whether cameras should be permitted to record courtroom proceedings for
publication or broadcast has been hotly debated for at least ninety years' - from
the earliest days of cinema and well before the invention of the television, the
medium that is the main focus of contemporary discussion.
It has generally been accepted that bans and restrictions on camera recording
of court proceedings in both the United States and England were initially imposed
in response to the disruption ofjudicial proceedings caused by the in-court use of
inherently distracting and intrusive photographic and audio-visual technology and
by media excesses accompanying such recordings and subsequent broadcasts or
screenings.6
See, e.g., Allowing Camerasand Electronic Media in the Courtroom: Hearingon
S.721 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Edward Becker, Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the
4

Third Circuit); N.Y. STATE COMM. TO REVIEW AUDIO-VISUAL COVERAGE OF CT.
PROCEEDINGS, AN OPEN COURTROOM: CAMERAs IN NEW YORK 207 (1997) [hereinafter

CAMERAS IN NEW YORK] (minority report of Leonard Noisette); DAVID M. LEPOFSKY,
Cameras in the Courtroom - Not Without My Consent, in OPEN JUSTICE 333-87 (1994);
Robin Day, Injustice Seen to Be Done, THE SPECTATOR, Dec. 30, 1995, at 11.
' Even in Australia, where television was only introduced in time for the 1956
Melbourne Olympic Games, the debate has gone on for over twenty years.
6 For a discussion of the early 1920s British parliamentary debates that led to the
imposition of a statutory ban on courtroom photography "because photographs attracted
interest in such unwholesome matters as proceedings in court," see Martin Dockray, Courts
on Television, 51 MOD. L. REV. 593, 597 (1998); Adrian C. Laing, Televising the Courts in
the UK, 7 MEDIA LAw 46 (1989); Susan Prince, Camerasin Court: What Can Cameras in
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The 1935 Flemington, New Jersey trial ofBruno Hauptmann for the kidnap and
murder of Charles Lindbergh's son was particularly significant.7 Public criticism
of media coverage of the trial appeared to tap existing public disquiet at the
intrusive and sensationalist nature of the media's reporting of court proceedings,'
turning it into a movement to regulate media reporting, which culminated in the
imposition of a virtual prohibition on audio-visual coverage of American court
proceedings.
Accounts of the trial suggest that the numbers and behaviour of media
personnel in the courtroom may indeed have been disruptive and an undignified
spectacle.' National and international interest in the trial was such that up to 141
press reporters and photographers, 125 telegraph operators, and 40 messenger boys
were said to have been present in the courtroom at one time."0 Media scrutiny
outside the courtroom, boosted no doubt by the presence of show business
celebrities, also led to a situation where it was said that "[w]itnesses,jurors, anyone
remotely associated with the trial were fair game for the press."" Some media
representatives breached restrictions on coverage imposed by presiding Judge
Trenchard. In particular, in clear breach of their agreement not to photograph and
film while the court was in session, press photographers took photographs of the
Lindberghs on the stand, and of Hauptmarm as the guilty verdict was read out. The
prohibited filming of several days of proceedings by a newsreel camera ultimately
led the judge to stop all further camera coverage."
ParliamentTeach Us?, 1998 CONTEMP. ISSUESIN L. 82,83 (1998); see also Daniel Stepniak,
British Justice: Not Suitable for Public Viewing?, in CRIMINAL VISIONS: MEDIA
REPRESENTATIONS OFCRIME AND JUSTICE (Paul Mason ed., 2003). Forthe early U.S. debate,
see ABA Comm. on Prof 1Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 67 (1932); MARJORIE COHN
& DAVID Dow, CAMERAS INTHE COURTROOM: TELEVISION AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
14-17 (1998); RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE AND THE

COURTS 7-9 (1998); Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the Adoption of the Ban on
Courtroom Cameras, 63 JUDICATURE 14, 18 (1979); Report of the Special Comm. on
CooperationBetween Press,Radio and Bar, as to Publicity Interferingwith FairTrial of
Judicialand Quasi-JudicialProceedings,62 A.B.A. REP. 851 (1937) [hereinafter ABA
Report].
7 See State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).
For a discussion of pre television publicity of trials, see GOLDFARB, supra note 6, at
1-8; J. Anthony Lukas, Big Trouble: Celebrity Trials and the Good Old Days that Never
Were, 12 MEDIA STUDIES J. 46-49 (1998).
9 See COHN & Dow, supra note 6, at 14-17; Kielbowicz, supra note 6, at 18.
o COHN & Dow, supra note 6, at 15
i W.E. FRANCOIS, MAss MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 358 (1990).
12 Kielbowicz, supranote 6, at 19. Cohn and Dow offer an alternative account, suggesting
that in spite of the restrictions imposed by the judge, "Sheriff John Curtiss made a
gentlemen's agreement with five newsreel companies, allowing them to film the trial
provided they showed no footage until the verdict." COHN &Dow, supra note 6, at 15. This
is said to have led to the introduction of additional lighting that "helped boost temperatures
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In spite of such breaches, there is little evidence to suggest that the employment
of still and newsreel cameras in itself disrupted the trial. Indeed, as Richard
Kielbowicz has noted, the fact that the unauthorised newsreel camera filming
remained undetected by the judge and lawyers for several days appears to challenge
the view that the subsequent prohibition of courtroom filming and photography by
the ABA was justified by the inherent disruptiveness of cameras and recording
equipment in this trial."
Spurred into action by concerns allegedly highlighted by the media coverage of
the Hauptman trial, ABA's Special Committee on Cooperation Between the Press,
Radio and Bar put forward unanimous recommendations on measures to curb extralegal comments 4 and the "surreptitious procurement ofpictures or sound records."'"
Though appearing to also unanimously recommend an absolute ban on the use of
cameras or photographic appliances in the courtroom, the Committee in fact made
it clear that it was simply "recommending that the use of cameras in the courtroom
should be only with the knowledge and approval of the trial judge"' 6 and reported
disagreement on whether the consent of counsel should also be a precondition of
camera coverage. 7 The Committee appeared to be even less prepared to take an
unqualified stance in opposition of the use of "sound registering devices."'" The
Committee ultimately conceded that problems inherent in then-current recording
technology justified a prohibition of their use. It observed that "all mechanisms
which require the participants in a trial consciously to adapt themselves to the
exigencies of recording and reproducing devices distract attention which ought to
be concentrated upon the single object of promoting justice."' 9 However, it noted
that "[i]t may well be that the future will provide some method by which a faithful
sound record of the proceedings of the court can be used to extend the trial beyond
the limits of the audience possible in the courtroom itself."20 Acting on the
Committee's report and recommendations, the 1937 ABA Convention adopted
Canon 35 of the Code of Professional and Judicial Ethics, entitled "Improper
'
Publicizing of Court Proceedings."'
in the gallery to uncomfortable levels." Id. In any event, the newsreel film was screened in
some 10,000 American cinemas.
13 Kielbowicz, supra note 6, at 18-19.
'4 ABA Report, supra note 6, at 865.
" Id. at 862.
16 Id.
17 Id.
" Id. at 864.
19 Id.
20 Id.

21 Canon 35 read:

Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
taking of photographs in the court room during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to
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The Canon 35 prohibition coincided with moves by a number of U.S. state and
local legislatures and bar and judicial organisations to also ban photography and
broadcasting of judicial proceedings." The Canon was amended in 1952 to ban
television cameras specifically.3 In so doing, the ABA added "and distract the
witness in giving his testimony" to the Canon's rationale:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and
decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions

of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or
telecasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the
essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving his

testimony, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect
thereto in the minds of the public and should not be permitted. 4
By 1965 all state courts - with the exception of Colorado, Texas and
had banned television cameras from their courtrooms. 6 The

Oklahoma2 '

prohibition on audio-visual coverage also extended to federal courts. In 1946, Rule
53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, banning photography and radio
broadcasting of criminal trials in federal courts came into effect.27 In 1962, the
Judicial Conference of the United States unanimously condemned audio-visual

recording of court proceedings, deeming "such practices to be inconsistent with fair

judicial procedure. 28

detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and
create misconceptions with respect thereto in the minds of the public and should
not be permitted.
CODE OF PROF'L AND JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1937).
22 See Kielbowicz, supra note 6, at 20 (discussing actions by Maryland, Los Angeles, and
New York).
23 CODE OF PROF'L AND JUDICIAL ETHics Canon 35 (1952).
' Proceedingsof the (ABA) House ofDelegates:Mid-Year Meeting, 38 A.B.A. J.425,
427 (1952) (amending Canon 35 of the Code of Professional and Judicial Ethics).
2 Interestingly, courts in Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas and Colorado experimented with
television coverage in their courtrooms during the 1950s.See COHN & Dow, supra note 6,
at 18. A 1953 Oklahoma Trial is believed to be the first to be recorded and broadcasted. Id.
26 For an outline of the development of the Canon 35 prohibition, see Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 596-601 (1965) (appendix to opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
2 For the text of the rule and discussion, see Laralyn M. Sasaki, ElectronicMedia Access
to FederalCourtrooms:A JudicialResponse, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 769-811 (1990).
2s Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 10
(1962); see also Erwin N. Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35
Should Not be Surrendered,48 A.B.A. J.615, 618 (1962).
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InEstes v. Texas the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to endorse the basis of these
prohibitions - the inherent disruptiveness of camera coverage.29 In that case, the
Court held that the media's recording of the pre trial hearing and parts of the trial
had disrupted proceedings and consequently deprived the defendant of his
constitutional right to due process." The Court's ruling was not based on evidence
of any actual prejudice suffered by the defendant, but on what the Court saw as
problems inherent in the presence of cameras - the potential impact on jurors,
witnesses, the defendant, and the additional responsibilities imposed on a trial
judge." Significantly, however, while holding that a defendant's right to a fair trial
outweighed any access right the media might have to televise proceedings, some
members of the Court foreshadowed a day when technological advances would
bring about a change in the effect that television coverage had on the fairness of a
trial.32
The extent of the prohibition appeared to peak shortly after Estes. By the early
1970s, only Colorado courts permitted camera coverage.33 In 1972, the ban on
audio-visual coverage of federal court proceedings was extended from criminal
trials to all proceedings when the Judicial Conference of the United States enacted
Canon 3A(7) ofthe Code of Conduct for U.S.judges, prohibiting the "broadcasting,
televising, recording or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately
adjacent thereto ....
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
The preliminary hearing and parts of the trial of celebrity Texan financier Billie Sol
Estes, were recorded and broadcast on television in spite of his objections. In adjudging that
the recording process had disrupted proceedings, the opinions referred to aNew York Times
newspaper report of"a television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus" parked outside
the courthouse, which described the courtroom as "a forest of equipment" with six television
cameras, numerous microphones and cables and wires snaked over the floor and mentioned
a "jury box, now occupied by an overflow of reporters from the press table." See id. at 536;
id. at 553 (Warren, J., concurring).
"' See id. at 545-50.
32 Justice Clark's majority opinion noted that "the ever-advancing techniques of
public
communication and the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in
the effect of telecasting upon the fairness of criminal trials." Id. at 551-52. He further noted
that "when the advances in these arts permit reporting by... television without their present
hazards to a fair trial we will have another case." Id. at 540. Justice Harlan noted in his
concurring opinion:
[T]he day may come when television will have become so commonplace an
29

30

affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable

likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process. If and
when that day arrives the constitutional judgment called for now would of course
be subject to re-examination.
Id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33 KENNETH CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 290 (1993).

3, MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROLKRAFKA, FED. JUD. CTR., ELECTRONIC MEDIA
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Similarly, in Britain the publication of courtroom photographs, and particularly
a photograph depicting Old Bailey Judge Bucknell in the act of passing sentence of
death on convicted murderer Frederick Seddon, and apparently taken without the
consent of the court," was used by parliamentarians to justify the enactment of the
statutory prohibition of courtroom photography,36 which remains in place in
England and Wales.37 Even Nick Catliff, the BBC television producer who
pioneered camera access to Scottish courts, has summarized the events leading up
to the statutory ban on the use of cameras in English courts in the following terms:
"[flollowing several rather sordid attempts by the press to take sneak photographs
in court, all cameras were outlawed."3 Though such an explanation is increasingly
challenged, it nevertheless continues to play a significant role in promoting the view
that the initial prohibitions on audio-visual coverage of court proceedings were
imposed due to the inherent disruptiveness of the equipment used, or misused, by
the media.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND THE RELAXATION OF THE BAN

A study of press and broadcast reporting in courtrooms stated that:
By the mid-1970s, technology had advanced to the point where coverage
of events by broadcast media had fewer distractions; no longer were
lights needed for more sophisticated TV cameras. Cameramen could be
content to cover trials from a fixed position, rather than roam at will.
COVERAGEOFFEDERALCIVILPROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOTPROGRAM INSix
DISTRICT COURTS AND Two COURTS OF APPEALS 3 (1994); see also COHN & Dow, supra
note 6, at 112.
3s The photograph was published in the Mirrornewspaper on March 15, 1912. See the
photograph and further discussion of the incident in Laing, supra note 6; see also Martin
Dockray, A Sentence of Death, COUNSEL, May/Jun. 1989, at 17.
36 See JOSEPH JACONELLI, OPEN JUSTICE: A CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL 315-16
(2002); Dockray, supra note 6, at 593; Laing, supra note 6, at 46; Prince, supra note 6, at
83; Stepniak, supra note 6, at 255-58.
31 Section 41 of the CriminalJusticeAct 1925 prohibits both the taking and publishing
of photographs in courtrooms and even in precincts of court buildings. The Act states:
No person shall: (a) take or attempt to take inany court any photograph, or with
a view to publication make or attempt to make in any court any portrait or
sketch, of any person, being a judge of the court or a juror or a witness in or a
party to any proceedings before the court whether criminal or civil; or (b)
publish any photograph, portrait or sketch taken or made in contravention of the
foregoing provision of this section or any reproduction thereof.
Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 86, § 41 (Eng.).
38 Nick Catliff The Trial and the British Experience, Address at the Cameras in the
Courtroom Conference, Southampton Institute (Feb. 12, 1999).
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Microphones were more common and less fear-evoking than in the
generation previous."
Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, a number ofU.S. state courts began to relax
their prohibition by granting television cameras access to their courts on an
experimental basis. Even the ABA relaxed its opposition to in-court cameras when
it reaffirmed its opposition to camera coverage through the 1972 replacement of
Canon 35 with Canon 3A(7) of its Code of Judicial Conduct, which permitted
cameras to be admitted into courts for certain non-news-gathering purposes."'
An analysis of its own experiment with cameras led the Supreme Court of
Florida in the 1979 case In rePetition ofPost-Newsweek Stations,to conclude that
new technology had made obsolete the physical disruption objection to the presence
of television cameras in courtrooms."' This finding was virtually endorsed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1981 case of Chandler v. Florida,42 where the Court
ruled that the advances in the state of television technology, which it had foreseen
in Estes v. Texas, had now effectively come to pass.43 Though still of the view that
the use of cameras in court potentially endangered a defendant's right to a fair trial,
the Court ruled that an absolute ban on the televising of court proceedings was
unjustified in the absence of actual evidence and proof that such a contingency had,
in fact, materialised.'
Consequently, it warrants underlining that over twenty years ago, American
courts recognised that developments in audio-visual recording technology had
advanced to the point where, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presence of cameras in court could no longer be presumed to be inherently
physically disruptive, and thus, prejudicial to a fair trial. Considering how far
audio-visual recording technology has advanced since 1981, presumptions as to
inherent physical disruption ought to no longer figure in the cameras-in-courts
debate. Currently, not only is state-of-the-art audio-visual recording equipment
unobtrusive, but, importantly, its increasing utilisation in courts for other purposes,
such as the recording of transcripts, video links, amplification or CCTV, means that
the recording of proceedings for broadcast need no longer even involve the presence
of additional cameras, microphones or personnel in the courtroom. Increasingly,
'9 Val E. Limburg et al., How PrintandBroadcastJournalistsPerceivePerformanceof
Reporters in Courtroom, 65 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 621, 621 (1988); see also David
Graves, Cameras in the Courts: The Situation Today, 63 JUDICATURE 24 (1979).
40 FRANcois, supra note 11, at 392; Diane L. Zimmerman, Overcoming FutureShock:
Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposalfor the ConstitutionalProtection of the NewsGatheringProcess, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 667-69 (1980).
4' 370 So. 2d 764 (1979).
42 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
41 Id. at 576.
4 Id. at 578-79.
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audio-visual recording of courts and tribunals is undertaken by utilising a court's
own audio-and/or visual-recording equipment,45 or a court's own recordings."
M. OPPOSITION EXTENDING BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
To express dismay that many courts continue to prohibit audio-visual recording
and broadcast of proceedings, in spite of the long-standing acceptance that
technological advances have eliminated opposition grounded in concerns for the
distraction and disruption inherent in audio-visual recording, would be to overlook
concerns that arguably played a more significant role in the imposition of the
original prohibitions and continue to influence the debate.
While concerns relating to courtroom distraction and disruption caused by
audio-visual recording may be said to have been allayed,47 concerns relating to
breaches of recording restrictions remain and appear to be reignited by high-profile
celebrity trials such as the 1993 O.J. Simpson trial and the current Kobe Bryant
trial."s As this has been a key and long-standing concern, the relaxation of
restrictions and prohibitions currently applied to audio-visual coverage is not only
contingent on the judiciary accepting that such coverage is in the interests of the
administration of justice, but also dependant on coverage being appropriately
regulated and sufficiently under courts' control to ensure that such concerns do not
eventuate.
Even the "media-only-has-itself-to-blame" explanation for why it is consistent
for courts to dispense open justice and yet restrict or deny access to television
cameras may be said to mask arguably more significant explanations for the initial
banning of cameras from British, American, and other common law courtrooms, and
"$ As, for example, is the case in the Canadian Supreme Court. See DANIEL STEPNIAK,
FED. CT. OF AUS., ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF CoURTS 6.2-6.10 (1998).
" As is the case in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, where
the Tribunal records all proceedings and makes videotapes available to the media on a thirtyminute delay basis, though on at least one occasion - in December 2003, when former
NATO commander and former Democratic presidential candidate Wesley Clark testified in
the trial of Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, the Tribunal agreed to edit the
transcript of the testimony before making it public, at the request of the U.S. government. See
generally Paul Mason, Report on the Impact of Cameras at the International Criminal
Tribunalforthe Former Yugoslavia (2000), available at http://www.usfca.edu/pj/cameramason.htm.
"$ The fact that such disruption may still be seized upon to exclude cameras was
memorably illustrated in Canada when a technical glitch in the audio recording of the 1981
PatriationReference case led the Canadian Supreme Court to suspend further television
camera recording of its proceedings until 1993. See Reference re Questions Concerning
Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
48 See, e.g., Kobe in the Dock: Yet Another "Trial of the Century" is Gearing Up, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 34 [hereinater Kobe in the Dock].
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incidentally, provide more persuasive explanations for why many courts continue
to resist electronic media coverage.
The early twentieth-century prohibitions of audio-visual court reporting may be
more accurately explained as reflecting official disapproval of the media's
promotion and facilitation of widespread public interest in judicial proceedings. In
referring to the British parliamentary debates of the 1920s, which led to the
enactment ofthe statutory ban on photography, Martin Dockray observed: "[lit was
precisely because photographs attracted interest in such unwholesome matters as
proceedings in court that they were suppressed in 1925." '
Records of
parliamentary proceedings reveal, for example, that during the Second Reading
Speech debate on the Criminal Justice Bill in the House of Commons on May 11,
1925, Mr. Goodman Roberts declared the clause banning the taking of photographs
in court to be "very reasonable and very commendable" and thus likely to "meet
with everyone's assent" and went on to observe that:
It is a pity, no doubt, that it could not be extended to taking photographs
outside police courts of the whole of the people who are concerned in
these causes c¢lbres, and all around prevention of the publicity
attaching to cases which had better be left much less commented upon
than they are at the present time."
Similarly, in the United States, the ABA opposed the broadcast of court
proceedings in the early 1930s because it considered such coverage to change "what
should be the most serious of human institutions . . . into an enterprise for the
entertainment of the public .... Using such a trial for the entertainment of the
public or for satisfying its curiosity shocks our sensibilities."'"
Heightened levels of public interest in judicial proceedings continue to elicit
expressions of concern by politicians, lawyers, and judges. The voicing of such
reservations following the admission of cameras into Scottish courtrooms in the
early-1990s provoked reactions from the media in England who commented that
feelings of resistance towards trial television were based in pretentiousness. 2
Where snobbery or elitism lies behind such objections, they clearly warrant
exposure for their unsustainability in a world that has discarded blind obedience of
authority and in which true respect is sought through familiarity and understanding,
rather than blissful ignorance or unquestioning reliance on the wisdom of those in
authority. 53

'9 See Dockray, supranote 6, at 597.
'o Hansard Reports, House of Commons, May 11, 1925, at 1616.
5' ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 67 (1932).
52 This author remembers reading such comments in the Evening Standard.
5 For arguments in favour of restricting the publicity of criminal proceedings, see
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems Posedby Publicity to Crime and CriminalProceedings,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 11-26 (1961).
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The early prohibitions also reflected the legal establishment's disdain for the
intrusiveness of courtroom reporting and concerns for the impact that such
concerted media attention, and particularly audio-visual recording and broadcasts,
may have on trial participants. Thus, in the course of his second reading speech on
the proposed statutory ban, Home Secretary Sir William Joynson-Hicks presented
the following brief rationale for the prohibition: "everybody has suffered for a long
time by prisoners in the dock and witnesses being pilloried by having their
photographs taken, and this is to prevent that happening."' Reporting of celebrity
civil cases was also criticised for its invasion of privacy, with extensive press
coverage of high-profile divorce proceedings also supporting the enactment of the
English statutory ban on courtroom photography.55
Such concerns relating to the perceived invasion of privacy and the
psychological impact of extensive media coverage, no matter how unobtrusive, on
those participating in trials are unlikely to be eased by new technology.56 However,
public familiarisation with, and increased utilisation of, audio-visual technology
may serve to lessen the impact of audio-visual coverage on participants. For
example, persons holding public positions now expect media attention and scrutiny,
while ever-present CCTV cameras that record our movements in public make very
few of us self-conscious.
Advances in technology may have led to a recognition that the audio-visual
recording ofproceedings is no longer inherentlyphysicallydistracting or disruptive,
but they have not allayed the original and ongoing concerns regarding media
reporting'spsychologicalimpact on participants, its fueling of public interest in the
details ofjudicial proceedings, nor the perception that audio-visual reporting is, in
the words of Canon 35, "calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the
proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the
minds of the public."57
Though it is true that experiments and studies do not substantiate such concerns,
neither do they conclusively prove them to be unfounded. Regardless of the
findings of studies, it is the public perception of whether audio-visual coverage has
a negative effect that ultimately determines whether justice is seen to be denied or
Hansard Reports, House of Commons, May 11, 1925, at 1599.
5 See Dockray, supra note 6, at 594-96.
56 Technology has introduced some novel privacy concerns. Courts in Australia, Japan
and Britain have expressed concern at privacy and security issues flowing from the use of
such phones in courtrooms. See Garry Barker, Courts May Crack Down on Mobiles,
The Age (Melbourne,
Australia)
June
17,
2003,
at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/06/16/1055615728563.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2004); Camera-EquippedCell Phones Courting Disaster, MAINICHI DAILY NEwS, Nov. 3,
2002, athttp://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/features/0211/03cameraphones.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2004).
57 CODE OF PROF'L AND JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1937).
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prejudiced by the audio-visual coverage. Ultimately it could be said that it is how
such coverage is introduced and regulated that matters, rather than whether it is
permitted. Thus, the perception that audio-visual coverage will adversely impact
participants is certain to be lessened if such coverage is introduced with input and
agreement of the bench, bar, media and organizations representing the interests of
victims of crimes, as well as the public. Studies have also revealed that the
acceptability of such coverage hinges on those involved being accustomed to such
technology and scrutiny. 58 This appears to support the view that audio-visual
coverage should be introduced incrementally, beginning with proceedings least
likely to be adversely affected. This would permit judges and lawyers to grow
accustomed to the presence of cameras and members of the public to come to see
broadcasts of proceedings as just another aspect of the public administration of
justice.
IV.ANALYSING CONCERNS
Since the 1970s, numerous experiments with and studies of cameras in courts
have been undertaken not only in the United States, but in other common law
countries, such as Canada, Britain, New Zealand, and Australia.59 Without
exception, such studies and experiments have revealed that courtroom recording for
broadcast has no significant detrimental impact on courtroom participants or on the
administration of justice, and have declared potential dangers capable of being
addressed through appropriate regulations." For example, following a year-long
study of overseas experiences with cameras in courts, the Working Party of the
Public Affairs Committee ofthe General Council of the Bar (of England and Wales)
released a report6 in which it concluded that "the benefit of televising outweighs
" See, e.g.,CAMERAS INNEW YORK, supranote 4, at 78; JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supranote
34, at 7; Allison Small, Cameras in the Courtroom:Pilot ProjectPreliminaryReport and
Survey Results, Mar.6, 1997, in ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURTS, supra note 45,
at app. 51, sched. 5.
'9 See, e.g., JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 34, at 7; Televising the Courts:Report of
Working Party of the PublicAffairs Committee of the General Council of the Bar (1989)
(summarizing the findings of a study carried out by the General Council of the English and
Welsh Bar) [hereinafter Caplan Report]. For a discussion of these and other experiments and
studies, including the evaluations of Canadian experiments, see ELETRONIC MEDIA
COVERAGE OF COURTS, supra note 45.
' For an overview ofthe findings, see Susanna Barber, News Camerasin the Courtroom:
A Review of the EmpiricalLiterature, 8 PROGRESS IN COMM. SCIS. 177 (1987). However,
some have questioned the methodology and conclusiveness of such findings. See, e.g., Ralph
E. Roberts, Jr., An EmpiricalandNormativeAnalysis ofthe Impact of Televised Courtroom
Proceedings, 51 SMU L. REV. 621-45 (1998); Dan Slater & Valerie P. Hans,
MethodologicalIssues in the Evaluationof "Experiments" with Cameras in the Courts, 30
COMM. Q. 376-80 (1982).
61 Caplan Report, supra note 59.
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the arguments against it" 2 and recommended that legislation be amended to allow
a televising of court proceedings under strict controls, for a trial period of two
years. 3 The Working Party deemed objections to the televising of courts to be
"based largely on fears which, in practice, are revealed to be unfounded, and in part
upon an emotive reaction to television,"'' and urged that any inherent risks could
be "effectively removed or controlled by the rules of coverage and the trial judge's
ought not to be perceived as "justification for banning the camera
discretion" and
S
altogether."
Though such consistently reassuring experiences and positive evaluations have
caused a continually increasing number ofjurisdictions and courts to permit audiovisual coverage, opposition and concerns continue to be heard." It is often
overlooked that even jurisdictions that in theory permit audio-visual coverage of
court proceedings rarely do so in practice, because their judges choose to exercise
their discretionary powers to deny access to the electronic media. Significant
reservation is found among many judges in the United States and New Zealand,
where cameras are permitted in most courts, albeit under varying levels of
6
restrictions;6 7 England, where a statutory ban remains in place; and countries such
Id. at35, para. 4.13.
Id. at 49, para. 7.1 (recommendation iv).
Id. at 47, para. 6.1.
65 Id. at 46, para. 6.1.
66 Perhaps the most compelling outline ofarguments against televising court proceedings
is to be found in Leonard Noisette's dissenting minority report of the N.Y. State Committee's
recommendation to allow audio-visual coverage of court proceedings. See CAMERAS INNEW
YORK, supra note 4 (minority report of Leonard Noisette). For a detailed analysis of this
dissenting report, see ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURTS, supra note 45, at
4.56-4.78. An interesting illustration was provided by a superior court in Prague, which in
late October 2003, cancelled the Czech Republic's first live televised trial very shortly after
proceedings got under way. See Kathleen Knox, Czech Republic: Verdict Still Out on Merits
of Televised Trials, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, available at
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/10/3010200 3174829.asp (last visited Jan. 24,2004);
see also Czech Television to Offer Live Coverage for Murder Trial, at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/10/3-CEE/cee-241003.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2003).
67 For a detailed listing of the level of audio-visual coverage permitted in American
courts, see RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRs. Ass'N & FOUND., CAMERAS INTHE COURT: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE, availableathttp://www.rtnda.org/foi/scc.shtnl (last visited Jan. 24,
2004). Since May 2000, New Zealand courts permit radio, television coverage, and press
photography of their proceedings, albeit subject to strict guidelines. See 2003 New Zealand
Guidelines for Media Coverage of Court Proceedings, available at
http://www.courts.govt.nz/media/mediacoverageguidelines.hml (lastvisited Jan. 24,2004).
This move followed the positive assessment of the three year (1995-1998) pilot project in
the High Courts in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and the District Court in Auckland.
See KIMBERLY ALLAN ET AL., DEP'T FOR CTS., THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION, RADIO AND STILL
PHOTOGRAPHY COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS - FINAL REPORT, (1998). For further
discussion of the New Zealand experience, see ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURTS,
supra note 45, at ch. 3.
68 It appears, however, increasingly likely that the Department of Constitutional Affairs
62
63
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as Scotland, Canada, and Australia, where though not prohibited by statute, largely
only ad hoc camera coverage has been permitted by the judiciary.6 9
It appears that the positive findings of studies and experiments have failed to
quash the reservations of opponents. It is probably true to say that neither those
arguing in favour of audio-visual coverage nor those opposed have made headway.
This has led to an impasse.
V. WHY THE IMPASSE?

A consideration of explanations for this impasse, I believe, serves to identify
policy and legal implications of the audio-visual recording and broadcast of court
will soon authorize experimental recording of appeal hearings, with a view to assessing the
nature and potential of recordings before deciding whether to lift or relax the statutory ban
on courtroom photography that has existed since 1925. For a discussion of moves towards
such an experiment, see Stepniak, supranote 6, at 274-75; Matt Wells & Clare Dyer, First
Step to Put Cameras into Courtroom, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,3604,1086759,00.html.
69 Audio-visual coverage of Scottish courts is not subject to the statutory ban of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1925. Coverage is governed by guidelines issued in 1992 by the Lord
President of Scotland, Lord Hope. These guidelines impose strict conditions on the recording
and broadcast of judicial proceedings. For a reproduction of these guidelines, see BBC v.
Petitioners No. 1, J.C. 419, para. 6 (2000), available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/\
index l.asp (last visited Jan. 24,2004). A number of documentaries have been filmed subject
to these guidelines. The appeal in the Lockerbie Bomber's case remains the only Scottish
judicial proceeding that has been permitted to be recorded for news broadcast. For a
discussion of Scottish experience with cameras, see Stepniak, supra note 6, at 263-66. On
Lockerbie, see Ros McInnes, Scotch Mist: The Lockerbie TrialandArticle 10, 46 J.L. SOC'Y
OF SCOT. 21-23 (2001).
While no statutory prohibition of audio-visual recording exists in Australia, most
Australian courts have been reluctant to permit cameras to record and broadcast their
proceedings. Some judges of the Australian Federal Court and the state courts of Victoria,
South Australia, and Western Australia have permitted audio-visual reporting on an ad-hoc
basis. Western Australia remains the only Australian jurisdiction to have formulated specific
guidelines for audio-visual coverage. For a detailed discussion of the Australian experience,
see ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURTS, supra note 45, at ch. 7.

Apart from the Supreme Court of Canada, which has permitted all its proceedings to be
recorded and broadcast by CPAC since 1995, Canadian courts have also been hesitant to

admit cameras. While experimental programs undertaken by the Federal Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia have not led to any problems, the Canadian Judicial
Council remains opposed to cameras in Canadian courts. For a discussion of the Canadian
experience, see the Ad IDEM Web site: http://adidem.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). In
2001, the CJCrejected the recommendation of its Cameras in Courts Committee and declined
to reconsider the view that televising courts other than the Supreme Court of Canada "would
not be in the interests of the administration ofjustice," a position it has held since 1983. See
Cristin Schmitz, JudicialCouncil Divided Over TV Camerasin Court: "It's Like Working
in a JuristicJurassic Park,"says Critic, 21 LAws. WKLY. (2001).
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proceedings, which are often overshadowed by arguments over whether audiovisual recordings and broadcasts affect the participants of televised trials, and, in
particular, the parties' rights to a fair trial.
Particularly insightful is a consideration of the reasons given for opposing
audio-visual coverage ofappealhearings. In the absence of largely unsubstantiated,
but nevertheless understandable, concerns for the impact of recordings and
broadcast coverage on the rights of witnesses, jurors and parties, judicial opposition
to appellate coverage appears to focus on concerns for the preservation ofjudicial
anonymity, the mystique of the law, traditional court procedures, and a preference
for less than fully open justice.
U.S. federaljudges, and especially Supreme Court Justices, appearto base their
objections to camera coverage of appeal cases on the grounds that such coverage
would undermine the mystique of the appellate process, take away their
independence and anonymity, and turn their deliberations into subjects for street
talkc.7 Chief Justice Rehnquist is said to have "expressed fear about the loss of
'mystique and moral authority' that might result from camera exposure."'" Justice
Anthony Kennedy said in 1995, "I'm delighted I'm less famous than Judge Ito."72
Justice Byron White is said to have confessed one reason why he did not want his
court televised: "I am very pleased to be able to walk around, and very, very seldom
am I recognized. It's very selfish, I know."73 Such rationales, though
understandable as personal preferences, appear to dismiss the electronic media's
potential to enhance public access and understanding, and suggest a preference for
limited publicity of judicial proceedings in forms that are unintelligible or
inaccessible to the public at large.
Such objections raise the question: does audio-visual coverage of courts
undermine the authority of decisions as claimed by U.S. Supreme Court Justices?
While it is difficult to refute the suggestion that greater public exposure may lead
to more public commentary being personalised, it is also important to consider
whether confidence in and respect for the judicial system may not be undermined
by courts being the last public institution to resist the type of transparency that the
public is accustomed to with other public institutions. It is often said that the
judiciary is the arm of government that is most accountable because it conducts its
hearings in open courtrooms and delivers detailed reasons for its decisions. This
argument, however, loses any persuasiveness when we consider that few people are
able to attend and observe proceedings; that even judges and lawyers have difficulty
understanding judicial opinions; and that the vast majority of the population gain

their information from television, which is hampered in its coverage of court
70

See Tony Mauro, The Camera-ShyFederalCourts, 12 MEDIA STUD. J. 60 (1998).

7 Id. at 65.
72 Id. at 63.

3 Id. at 64.
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proceedings because it is rarely permitted to record and broadcast the visual content
that viewers expect.
Surveys of public perception of the judicial process carried out in common law
countries have revealed low levels of public understanding of the role of courts and
of judicial processes, and correspondingly low levels of confidence in the
judiciary.74 Significantly, such studies have also revealed a startling discrepancy
between public perceptions of courts and the courts' perceptions of their own
performance. In their analysis of the National Center for State Courts 1999
National Survey,75 David Rottman and Alan Tomkins concluded that "the general
public and the judiciary hold views of the courts so divergent as almost to be mirror
images. 76

The lack of public confidence in the judiciary often reflects a low level of
public understanding of the role of courts and the judicial process. This has led to
calls for courts to take an active role in promoting or facilitating public education
and awareness. For example, Professor Parker's 1998 Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration study led him to find that "[t]he court system needs to think
about proactive ways of educating the public about the role, function and activities
of Australian courts. It seems that there is considerable public receptiveness to
attempts to convey accurately what courts do and why they do it."77
South Australian Chief Justice John Doyle has argued that:
[C]onfidence of the public in the courts depends upon the public having
access to the courts, in the sense of being able to observe and understand
what the courts are doing ....
74

If the courts are going to leave it to

See, e.g., STEPHENPARKER, COURTs ANDTHEPUBLIC (1998); see also MARKETSHARE,

MARKET REPORT: COMMUNITY AND CLIENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUEENSLAND COURT
SYSTEM (1991); PUBLIC ATITrUDES SURVEYS LTD., NATIONAL SURVEY OF COURT USERS:
EXECUTIVE REPORT (1994); MARLENE WINFIELD, SEEKING CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF
PEOPLE'S NEEDS AND EXPERIENCES (1995); S. Wain, PublicPerceptionsofthe CivilJustice
System, in ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, RETHINKING CIVIL JUSTICE: RESEARCH
STUDIES FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE REVIEW (1996); Grace Meertens, Survey Finds Public

Unhappy with Courts, THE W. AUSTL. (Perth), Sept. 5, 1998, at 39. For a comparative
analysis, see PATRICIA KNAGGS, DEP'T FOR CTS., NEW ZEALAND, THE PROVISION OF
SERVICES FOR COURT CUSTOMERS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: A

LrrERATURE REVIEW AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY(1996).
15

NAT'L CTR. STATE CTS., How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A NATIONAL

SURVEY (1999), available at http://www.ncsconlne.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTCL
PublicViewCrtsPub.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
7 David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomdins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts:
What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, 36 COURT REV. 24, 31 (1999), availableat
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTC_SurveysMeanToJudgesPub.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
77 PARKER, supra note 74, at 163.
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others, the media in particular, to determine how much and what sort of
information the public gets about their workings, then the courts are
saying that they are content to leave it to others to shape the public
understanding and perception of the courts. That to me is not
acceptable. I believe that the courts are well placed to explain their
function. I consider that experience shows that leaving that task to
others is, in the long term, unsatisfactory.78

Accepting that the most relied upon source of public information on court
proceedings is the media, and particularly the electronic media, public confidence
in the judiciary may be said to hinge on media reporting of proceedings. For this
very reason, in Australia, Sir Ninian Stephen, former Australian Governor-General
and High Court Justice, urged the High Court to consider televising its proceedings
to redress falling public confidence and to counter misinformed public criticism of
the Court's "judicial activism."79 The High Court did not accept Sir Ninian's
advice, apparently rejecting the suggested link between public confidence and
electronic media access. Sir Ninian's call for the High Court to promote public
access was echoed recently by Professor Michael Coper who called on the High
Court to "make its judgments more accessible if there is to be proper dialogue on
its decision[s]. ""

However, currently the High Court appears less concerned with public
confidence; Chief Justice Gleeson is reported as saying that "above all it requires
the confidence of other judges and the legal profession."' Such an unfortunate
remark tends to reinforce the perception that our judiciary prefers to shroud its
administration of justice in mystique and resists greater transparency for fear that
the public may not approve of the manner in which justice is administered in their
name.

It could be argued that the potential to broadcast or stream the proceedings of
certain courts would appear to provide a means of addressing specific, current,
public concerns. Thus, the significant public concern voiced over New Zealand's
abolition of Privy Council appeals and the establishment of a New Zealand Court
of Appeal could in large measure be addressed by ensuring that the public, already
78

The Hon. John Doyle, The Courtsandthe Media: WhatReforms areNeeded and Why,

1U. OFTECH. SYDNEY L. REV. 25,26-27, availableathttp:lwww.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/
UTSLR/1999/6.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
79See Right Hon. Sir Ninian Stephen, Address on the Occasion of the President's
Luncheon at the Law Institute ofVictoria(Aug. 19,1988), in ELECTRONICMEDIACOVERAGE
OF COURTS, supra note 45, at 13.
80 David McLennan, High Court Decisions Must be Open to Dialogue - Professor
Michael Coper, CANBERRA TmES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 7.
"1 Bernard Lagan, Courting Controversy,THE BULLEnN, Oct. 14, 2003, at 30.
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accustomed to viewing trial proceedings on television, would be able to scrutinise
and judge for themselves whether the new court is politically biased. 2
Similarly, Britain's replacement of the system of Law Lords operating as a
committee ofthe House of Lords with a new Supreme Court coincides with reforms
designed to enhance the independence, access to, and transparency ofBritish courts.
Consequently, a pilot program, designed to ascertain and evaluate the nature of
potential television coverage, is shortly expected to be undertaken in the Court of
Appeal. Audio-visual coverage of Appeal Court hearings would permit the British
public to better scrutinise and understand the working of its courts, at a time of
controversial judicial reform. In the absence ofjuries and witnesses, it would also
appear to be suited perfectly to being the venue for the long-proposed experiment
with cameras in courts, 3 the first step towards removing the statutory ban on
courtroom photography.
Another ground for opposing the broadcast of appeal hearings was aired at the
time of the Bush v. Gore14 hearings, with Chief Justice Rehnquist presenting the
argument that camera coverage of the Court would alter the dynamics of oral
argument.85 While judges, whom I have asked to comment, have been split on
whether this would really be the case, the experiences of the Supreme Court of
Canada would not appear to support such a contention. 6 It is difficult to appreciate
why an avenue, which would permit the public to observe the submissions and oral
arguments in their highest court, should remain closed because it is feared that the
2 The

public outcry over the government's decision to abolish appeals to the Privy
Council and set up a new Supreme Court has been led by New Zealand's popular press.
Under the heading "Judges Will Be Under Microscope," the New ZealandHerald'sOctober
15, 2003 editorial declared that:
[Ilt will fall to the news media to scrutinise Supreme Court appointments in a
manner that judges in this country have never known. The influence these
appointees could exert on our lives and rights cannot allow them to be installed
without critical examination. This newspaper will ensure that each will receive
our most careful and searching attention. The court will be no place for judges
with a thin skin.
Editorial, Judges Will Be Under Microscope,THE N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 15, 2003, at A 18.
In his letter to the editor, published in the Sunday Star Times on October 19, 2003,
Auckland barrister Christopher Harder suggested that the formal recording of the proceedings
of the new court would serve to "make the abolition of the Privy Council more palatable to
those opposed to it." Christopher Harder, Tapes in Court, STAR TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at C9.
It may be of interest to note that most New Zealand Courts do not record the transcript of
their proceedings, and rely instead on long-hand notes taken by judges' associates.
813See Caplan Report, supra note 59, at 7.1; discussion supra note 68.
84 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
85 KSPS: Episode 9635 (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 18, 2001) (Charlie Rose
interview with William Rehnquist).
86 Since 1995, Canada has permitted all its judicial proceedings to be broadcast by
CPAC, Canada's political channel, without incident.
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public may not appreciate that questions asked by judges may not actually reflect
their own views, or that it may cause judges to be more careful in the questions that
they do ask. Educating the public or even considering changing the manner in
which appellate hearings are conducted may indeed be warranted, particularly ifwe
accept that facilitating greater public access and scrutiny is likely to lead to better
informed public commentary." Thus, courts have much to gain from permitting
camera coverage of oral argument. Why does the lack of public understanding of
appellate procedure apparently not concern Chief Justice Rehnquist, nor other
similarly disposed appellate court judges? Is this view symbolic of an elitism that
appears to maintain that lay people are best "kept in the dark," as too much
exposure to the complexities of the law will only confuse them? Such a view
appears to reveal an undesirable elitism and the existence of a concern, similar to
that expressed in the early twentieth century that the lay public ought not to be
permitted to become too involved or interested in judicial matters.
A recent media interview suggests that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
opposition to television coverage of the Supreme Court is at least in part based on
the argument that broadcasting of Supreme Court oral arguments would create a
false impression that the Court makes its decision on the basis of presented oral
arguments."8 I consider this argument to be quite significant in that it implicitly
concedes that members of the public observing proceedings from the public gallery
are equally misled and that the level and nature of currently permitted openness is
not such as would permit the public scrutiny required by the principle of open
justice.
Such a concession of the inadequate openness of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and consequently of appellate proceedings in U.S. courts, should not
be seen as a persuasive argument for the retention of the status quo, but as a
powerful argument for either more extensive media coverage, or the revision of
current appeal processes so as to permit such proceedings truly to be administered
openly. Rather than being seen as a sound argument for the prohibition of camera
coverage, it should be seen as an opportunity for technology to remedy the lack of
openness. Audio-visual transmission of oral argument supplemented by electronic
access to written submissions, either via the Internet or utilising available
" A more informed public commentary is particularly important in view of the gravity
of the issues concerned. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the
legitimacy of a U.S. presidential election). I wonder how much more informed the Australian
debate of Native Title would have been had the public been permitted to see and hear the
legal argument in Mabo and Others v. Queensland[No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.Rl 1, available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1992/23.html (last visited Dec. 20,2003), or
The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland (1996) H.C.A. 40, availableat
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/casescth/HCA/1996/40.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
s8 This Week (ABC television broadcast, July 6,2003) (interview with Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor).
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interactive digital broadcasting technology, would arguably permit members of the
public to acquire an understanding of cases, which they are currently deprived of,
not only through the absence of audio-visual coverage,89 but as a consequence of the
adoption of judicial procedures, such as reliance on written briefs and timerestricted oral submissions, introduced for the sake of efficiency.
In introducing procedural reforms in the name of efficiency, such as those
designed to reduce time-consuming and expensive court appearances, and often
through the utilisation of technical innovations such as e-court,90 care must be taken
to not overlook the impact such reforms may have on the public's ability to access
and scrutinise court proceedings. Where reforms do have such an impact,
consideration ought to be given to employing available technology to ensure that
court efficiency does not come at a cost to open justice.
Another reason why the debate over the admission of cameras in courtrooms
remains unresolved may be that the debate has become preoccupied with high
profile celebrity cases, and at times lacks the scrutiny and close analysis one expects
of a legal debate. There appears to be a great need to focus on available evidence
rather than anecdotal accounts of subjective, and at times uninformed, impressions.
For example, assumptions made about, and inferences drawn from, accounts of the
media's coverage of the O.J. Simpson case have taken on mythical dimensions, and
often ignore vital realities, such as the orderly and appropriate nature of the
Simpson trial proceedings, 9 and the substantive and procedural laws of other
jurisdictions that would prevent the most offensive aspects of that trial's media
89 Transcripts of Supreme Court hearings as well as Court opinions are now available
from the Court's Web site. See http://www.supremerourtus.gov/oraLarguments/argument_
transcripts.html and http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/opinions.html (last visited on
Dec. 20, 2003). Only on two occasions (Gore v.Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) and Grutter v.
Bollinger, 593 U.S. 306 (2003), the April 2003 University of Michigan affirmative action
cases) has the Court released audiotapes of the oral argument on the same day. See Karen
Aho, TV and the Supreme Court: BroadcastersWant Access, But Will They Deliver Serious

Coverage?,

5

COLUM.

JOURNALISM

REV.

(2003),

available at

http://www.cjr.org/issues/2003/5/tv-aho.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
'o In February 2001, the Federal Court of Australia commenced a pilot of its e-court
initiative, enabling parties "to participate in an electronic hearing which will replicate the

usual manner in which Court hearings are conducted but without the constraints of the
requirement that all of the parties (as well as the Judge) be in the courtroom at the (sic] one
time." Public notice issued by Warwick Soden, Registrar and ChiefExecutive, Federal Court
of Australia. See FED. CT. OF AuSTL: E-COURT (2001) (para. 9). In permitting hearings to
be conducted over the Internet, the court may be said to have operated in cyberspace. For
current information on the Court's initiative, seeO
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/ecourt/ecourtbackground.html (last visited on Mar. 15,2004).
"' Even opponents of cameras in courts concede that the televised proceedings were
conducted in a dignified and appropriate manner. See ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF
COURTS, supra note 45, at 88-89.
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coverage.92 Enforceable restrictions imposed on court reporting in common law
jurisdictions outside of the United States would unquestionably have avoided the
trial by media.93 When we consider what was objectionable about the Simpson trial,
we are likely to come up with a list of factors that appeared to be magnified by the
television coverage. The footage broadcast from inside the court appeared to
provide the only objective account of the trial. However, while even Jerrianne
Hayslett, the Los Angeles Superior Court Public Information Officer who oversaw
the media coverage of the case, admits that broadcast footage can sensationalise
some of the testimony and evidence,94 it does not mean that this mandates keeping
cameras out of court. Rather, it suggests that restrictions on camera coverage
should seek to ensure that viewers at home are presented with an audio-visual
experience as similar as possible to that of those personally attending the
proceedings."
As the 1981 inquest into the disappearance of Azaria Chamberlain revealed in
Australia, keeping cameras out of court and even strict regulation of reporting may
not suffice to prevent trial by media and the dissemination of misinformation.96 It
is worth remembering that the coroner in that inquest invited television cameras to
record his findings specifically to counter the misinformation disseminated by the
media from outside the courtroom. 7 It is important to concede that, having been
deprived of the opportunity to see and hear the trial for themselves, many
Australians remain convinced of Lindy Chamberlain's guilt on the basis of
8
discredited, selective media reporting."
As with assumptions made regarding the reasons for the imposition of original
prohibitions on courtroom photography and filming, there is a need to carefully
identify the causes of undesirable court reporting, without simply attributing the
cause to the use of audio-visual recording equipment in court.
9

See, e.g., Michael Chesterman, OJand the Dingo: How Media Publicity Relating to

CriminalCases Tried by Jury is Dealt with in Australia and America, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
109, 142-44 (1997) [hereinafter Chesterman, OJ and the Dingo]; Micheal Chesterman,
ControllingCourtroom Publicity: Common Law Strategies, INT'L LEGAL PRACTMIONER,
June 1985, at 47.
9' See Chesterman, OJand the Dingo, supra note 92, at 142-43.
'9 See COHN & Dow, supra note 6, at 83-84.
9' For a comprehensive discussion of related issues, see TIMOTHY R. MURPHY ETr AL.,
MANAGING NOTORIOUS TRtLs (2d ed. 1998).
96 Sam Lipski, Azaria CaseReflectsJournalism'sWorst- andBest,THEBuLLErN, Feb.
25, 1986, at 86. On media reporting of the Chamberlain inquests and trials, see generally
JOHN BRYSON, EvIL ANGELS (1985); KEN CRISPIN, LINDY CHAMBERLAIN: THE FULL STORY
(1990); NORMAN YOUNG, INNOCENCE REGAINED (1989).
97 NEW SoLTrH WAILS LAW REFORM COMM'N, PROCEEDINGS OF CTS. AND COMM'S
TELEVISION FILMING, SOUND RECORDING AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING, SKETCHES AND

PHOTOGRAPHS 34 (1984) (citing personal communication with Mr. Barritt, S.M).
11 Paul Toohey, Witch Hunt, THE AUSTRALIAN, July 15, 2000, available at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/extras/toohey/s Is1.html; see also supra note 96.
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An objective analysis of the media's reporting of high-profile trials will reveal
complexities extending well beyond the simplistic attribution of sensationalist
reporting to the electronic media. It will show that such media reporting had been
deemed a problem well before issues of audio-visual recording came into the
equation." As Hayslett notes, evidence also suggests that in-court television
camera coverage of a high-profile case may act as a catalyst for excessive media
coverage.

'0o

Importantly, those who have studied the effects of cameras in courtrooms have
drawn inconclusive results. Perhaps findings of studies and evaluations of
experiments with cameras in courts are deemed inconclusive because they
inevitably rely on measuring perceptions rather than actual impact of such recording
and reporting - a point expressly made in a qualification to the Federal Judicial
Center's evaluation of the study of the U.S. federal courts' pilot program.'
A number of issues emanate from the realisation that it is ultimately perceptions
as to the impact of audio-visual recordings and their subsequent broadcasts that
determine whether they are deemed appropriate. Evidence from numerous
jurisdictions suggests that perceptions of participants, including judges, as to the
desirability of audio-visual coverage tend to improve through personal
°
experience

02

Being aware of this, media organisations seeking access to courts

should not baulk at what they consider overly restrictive conditions that judges may
impose. Instead they may wish to see such as opportunities to reassure judges, who
on the basis of their positive experiences and improved perceptions of the process,
may be ready to assent to more extensive or liberal access. Public perceptions of
the desirability and appropriateness of audio-visual coverage have also been shown
to similarly improve. It is interesting to note that while the televising of Victorian
Supreme Court Justice Teague's sentencing of a convicted child murderer in May
1995 was the subject of much public criticism,' similar broadcasts today barely
warrant a mention.
" See supra note 6.
Hayslett, What a Difference a Lens Makes, 12 CT. MANAGER 21 (1997)

'0oSee Jerrianne

(comparing the media reporting of trials where television coverage was permitted with others
where such coverage was denied).
1o1JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 34, at 8.
102 See

id. at 7. For other studies see supra note 58.
"o3See, e.g., David Adams, ChildMurder:Judges Question TVSentence, THE AGE, Dec.
23, 1995, at 1-2; Nicole Brady & Rachel Gibson, A Mixed Reaction to a Slice of History,
THE AGE, May 19, 1995, at 8; Michelle Coffey & Rachel Hawes, Murder Sentence
BroadcastDivides the Nation, THE AusTRALIAN, May 19, 1995, at 1, 4; Michelle Coffey,
Telecast Whets an Appetite, THE AUSTRALIAN, May 19, 1995, at 4; Paul Conroy, Teague
Takes TV Lead But Reception Still Hazy, THE AGE, Dec. 23, 1995, at 2; Peter Gregory &
Rachel Gibson, Killer Gets Life as "TVJudge " Makes History, THE AGE, May 19, 1995, at

1,8.
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The nature of the evidence opponents of camera coverage demand be produced
as a prerequisite to the admission of cameras into courts also warrants scrutiny.
What is typically expected is conclusive evidence or reassurances that the presence
of cameras will not adversely effect participants; in particular, that it will not deter
witnesses from coming forward and participants will not be affected by an
awareness of being recorded. Such an approach to trial publicity, while almost
universally accepted and appearing eminently appropriate, appears to be at sharp
odds with classic statements of the principle of open justice. In the benchmark
House of Lords decision of Scott v. Scott, ° 4 Lord Atkinson appeared to stress that

the principle of open justice called for precisely such pressures and inconveniences
to be tolerated:
The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful,
humiliating, or deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many
cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so
indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and
endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to found, on the whole,
the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of
justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and
05
respect.'
It is worth considering why the cameras-in-courts debate is premised on proof
that audio-visual publicity will have no adverse effect on participants, will not
scandalise society, etc. Perhaps the test employed in Florida, where in order for
cameras to be denied access to proceedings, a court must be persuaded that
proceedings would be adversely affected because of a "qualitative difference"
between audio-visual and conventional media coverage, is a test much more in
keeping with the spirit of the principle of open justice."
Though evaluations on the basis of perceptions make it difficult to substantiate
the realisation of potential benefits of televised proceedings, such as the claimed
potential of audio-visual coverage to educate and inform the public, it is generally
accepted that, in a number of ways, broadcasts have not lived up to some claims and
expectations. Thus, in its evaluation of the federal courts' experiment with cameras
in courts, the Federal Judicial Center noted that electronic media coverage provided
little information to viewers about the legal process generally," 7 and that most
judges believed that the potential educational benefit had only been realised to a

101 [1913] A.C. 417.
"I5Id. at 463.
101 FLA. R. OF JUD. ADMIN. 2.170.

107 JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 34, at 35-36.
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small extent or not at all. 0 Similarly, the electronic media's almost exclusive focus
on criminal cases by the New Zealand broadcasters, and Canadian networks'
apparent lack of interest in utilising access to the Canadian Federal Court of

Appeal 9 disappointed many. It is also clear that commercial electronic-media
networks are not interested in "gavel-to-gavel" coverage. Even rare audiotape of
current U.S. Supreme Court oral argument does not appear to attract much media
attention." 0
Such findings may be seen by some as evidence that audio-visual coverage is
incapable of producing the benefits that proponents have claimed. On the other
hand, it may be seen as exposing a fundamental flaw in the thinking underlying the
issue of audio-visual coverage of court proceedings - the treatment of the
publication of audio-visual recordings of court proceedings as a vested media
interest and its promotion as a media right.
VI. COURTROOM BROADCASTING AS A MEDIA INTEREST

The broadcasting of court proceedings tends to be perceived as being in the
media's interest for a number of reasons. First, circumstances surrounding the
initial prohibitions of camera coverage together with subsequent media excesses in
the reporting of notorious cases created and maintained a perception of audio-visual
recording and broadcast of judicial proceedings as inherently incompatible with
judicial proceedings. Secondly, courts have difficulty with the nature of the
medium, which they view as an overly pervasive entertainment medium, which
values appearance over substance. Courts' preference for press reporting may be
attributed to traditional legal preference for written over oral or pictorial material
and its greater protection ofjudicial anonymity. As principles and rules regulating
court reporting were developed in the era ofpress reporting, the preference for press
reporting also stems from the courts' greater ability to regulate and enforce
10' Id. at 24.

109 Of approximately one thousand cases heard by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal
during the two years of the pilot program (1995 and 1996), only four cases were televised.
Small, supra note 58, 114-19, app. 51. Although the court extended the project, no
applications seeking camera access were received by the court in the following two years. Id.

at 119.
"o For a discussion, see Aho, supra note 89. Justice Kirby, the only Justice of the High
Court of Austrtalia who is openly supportive of courtroom televising, has lamented the lack
of media interest in covering judicial matters and has urged a proactive approach by the
judiciary. See Justice Michael Kirby, Media and Courts - The Dilemma, Speech at Southern
Cross University Graduation Ceremony (Apr. 27,2002), availableat http://www.hcourt.gov.
au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj dilemma.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2003). He has noted that the
High Court's decisions now appear on the Internet within ten minutes of their delivery and
urged that "[i]f our concern, as judges and citizens, is with law and justice, we must make
sure that information technology is more than a medium of entertainment." Id.
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reporting restrictions on the press. On the other hand, courts' disdain for the
electronic media's emphasis of the visual over the written could be seen as
inconsistent with courts' preference for vision over text, and recognition that
written accounts of proceedings cannot be relied on to draw reliable inferences, as
evidenced by appellate courts' reluctance to overrule a trial court's findings as to
the veracity of evidence and by courts' insistence on oral testimony. 11
It is no longer tenable for courts to ignore the reality that the vast majority of
the population receives their public information not from the press, but from
electronic media, and in particular from television. Equally it is important for
courts to accept that even press reporting is increasingly reliant on visuals to
supplement its stories and Internet publications.
The perception that audio-visual recording and broadcasting are media interests
has caused much of the debate, particularly in the United States, to focus on media
rights, which in turn has reinforced a public perception of the cameras-in-courts
debate as a struggle between the interests of the media and those of the judiciary.
By insisting that permission to record court proceedings is a constitutional right,
media organisations have forced courts into reactive stances and roles of defenders
of the competing rights of defendants to a fair trial - a First-versus-SixthAmendment battle. Though the constitutional debate is less than twenty-five-yearsold, it has undergone significant changes. In Gannett v. DePasquale,only Justice
Powell appeared to recognise that the press may have a First Amendment right to
insist on public trials, which needed to be considered alongside the Sixth
Amendment's protection of public trials for the benefit of a defendant." 2 Yet soon
after, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, a majority of the Supreme Court
recognised a First Amendment right for the press to attend a criminal trial."' In the
1984 case of Westmoreland v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, though not prepared to convert the public and press right of
access to court proceedings into a presumptive right of camera coverage, did leave
the door open to such a possibility, noting that additional experience with
telecasting could some day warrant the recognition of a presumptive right to televise
all court proceedings. "4 Twelve years later, in the Southern District of New York,

". This also raises the issue of whether audio-visual transcripts of trials should be capable
of being used by judges on appeal to overturn trial court findings as to the demeanor of
witnesses. See Anne Wallace, The Challenge of Information Technology in Australian
Courts, 9 J. OF JUD. ADMIN. 8, 15 (citing Australian Law Reform Commission,
Technology - What it Meansfor FederalDisputeResolution, Issues Paper 23,5.30 (1998),
availableathttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/pubfications/issues/23/ALRCIP23.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2003)).
112

443 U.S. 368, 398 (1979).

"' 448
114 752

U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985).
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1 that technological
Judge Sweet ruled in Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue,"
advances and several decades of cameras in courts, which had allayed initial
concerns, meant that the time to recognise a presumptive right to televise court
proceedings had arrived. A presumptive constitutional right to televise court
proceedings was also recognised by New York Supreme Court Judge Joseph C.
Teresi in People v. Boss." 6 Judge Teresi ruled that due to the positive findings of
evaluations of experiments with cameras in courts, earlier concerns were no longer
applicable, and thus, "should no longer stand as a bar to a presumptive First
Amendment right of the press to televise as well as publish court proceedings, and
of the public to view those proceedings on television.""' 7
Though few American courts recognise such a presumptive constitutional right,
it seems that if the U.S. Supreme Court were to revisit the specific issue of the
constitutional rights of the electronic media to gain permission to record court
proceedings, the Court would be unlikely to deny access in the absence of
overriding and appropriate reasons.
However, seeking admission on the basis of media rights, rather than on the
basis of such coverage being in the interests of the administration of justice,
arguably, has also had a negative impact, as it has reinforced the perception that
such coverage is a vested interest of the media and, consequently, that it ought only
be permitted on proof and condition of it not having an adverse effect on the
proceedings. In contrast, when the presence of cameras is considered in terms of
its potential to educate, inform, and ensure that justice is done, admission is less
likely to be contingent on the cameras' lack of impact on proceedings." 8
Possibly the most damaging implication of insisting on permission to record and
broadcast court proceedings is that the case for such coverage suffers a set-back
every time something occurs that underlines the reality that the interests ofjustice
and the electronic mass media do not always coincide.
VII. IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

British courts, and consequently those of most commonwealth countries, have
traditionally been entrusted with the regulation of court reporting. Such regulation
requires the courts to balancing the interests of the administration of justice,
including the right to a fair trial, against interests flowing from the open and

"s
116

17

923 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
701 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2000).

Id. at 894.

The conduct of Native Title cases by the Federal Court of Australia, often in remote
locations and in the absence of the formal trappings ofcourtrooms, is possibly an appropriate
18

illustration. See the description of the audio-visual recording of the Yorta Yorta hearings in
ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURTS, supra note 45, at 7.4-7.9.
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publicised administration ofjustice. In these jurisdictions, courts enforce restraints
and prohibitions on courtroom reporting through sub judice and contempt laws! 19
However, innovations in broadcasting technology, and in particular the growing
utilisation of the Internet as a form of communication and source of public
information, may be said to have undermined much of the rationale for subjudice
and contempt of court laws, as well as the principles used to severely restrict the
reporting of court proceedings in countries such as Britain, Canada, New Zealand
and Australia that were formulated at a time when the press was the dominant
source of public information. Broadcasting and information technologies,
particularly satellite broadcasting and the Internet, which are increasingly utilised
in the reporting of court proceedings, arguably highlight the inappropriateness and
inadequacy of continuing to regulate court reporting through sub judice and
contempt laws. They suggest a need to move away from the traditional enforcement
of reporting restrictions by courts towards greater reliance on open justice, freedom
of speech and the public's right to receive information. 2 ° By largely eliminating
the relevance of geographical boundaries, advances in broadcasting and information
technologies have served to undermine restrictions enforceable within
jurisdictions.'
They have also made calls for greater enforcement of identity
suppression justice sound futile.' 22
New and audio-visual technologies employed in court reporting may be said to
challenge some of the overriding principles and rules governing public and media
access to court proceedings. The principle of openjustice, or public administration
ofjustice, appears to be premised on the desirability of subjecting court proceedings
to the level of public scrutiny occasioned by permitting members of the public to
gain access to proceedings and court documents and journalists to attend and report
"9 See G. Stuart Adam, The Thicket ofRules North of the Border: Canadian Perspectives
on a Free Press and Fair Trials, 12 MEDIA STUD. J. 24 (1998). Adam provides an
informative insight into how Canada's approach to mediareporting of courts differs from that
of the United States. For a discussion of Canadian endeavours to reconcile freedom-ofspeech provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights with Canada's traditional English-style
contempt of court and sub judice laws, which empower courts to severely restrict the
reporting of court proceedings and even of pending decisions, see Dagenais v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 and Alberta v. The Edmonton Sun, [2003]
A.B.C.A. 3.
120 Clive Walker, FundamentalRights, FairTrials and the New Audio-Visual Sector, 59
MOD. L. REv. 517 (1996).
"' This is illustrated by the British Columbia trial of Robert Pickton, where the court had
to decide whether to close proceedings to the public because restrictions on media reporting
of preliminary hearings would not be effective or enforceable against Internet and U.S.
broadcasts accessible in British Columbia. See R. v. Pickton, (2002] B.C.P.C. 526.
12 As graphically illustrated by John Leslie in Britain (Editorial, Trial by Media: The
Leslie CaseRaises Key Questions, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 2003, at 25) and Kobe Bryant
in the United States (Kobe in the Dock, supra note 48, at 34).
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on what they saw - a concept the Chief Justice of New South Wales recently
described as "practical obscurity."' 23 Noting how electronic access has served to
enhance "the opportunity of access by the general public," Chief Justice Spigelman
suggested that even though the principle of open justice is unquestionably an
important principle, it has always been accepted that it "can operate unfairly in
some specific circumstances."' 24 Consequently, "exceptions to the right of access
to legal information have long been acknowledged"' 25 and further exceptions such
as restrictions imposed on the identification of victims of sexual assault and
juveniles accused of criminal offences, have been enacted by legislation. The
balance between publicity and the right to a fair trial, secured in this way, is,
according to the Chief Justice, being undermined by electronic access:
[T]he principle of open justice has operated in a system which, although
access was in theory available to all, there was a high level of what has
been called "practical obscurity". The identification of a person's
criminal past or involvement in litigation of any character was not
readily ascertainable. It is now." 6
This led him to suggest that "[d]evelopments in technology pose new challenges
to the ability to ensure a fair trial."'127 The Chief Justice went on to identify specific
areas of concern:
By reason of on-line access and the efficiency of contemporary search
engines, access to prior convictions and other information about the
conduct of individual accuseds or witnesses has been transformed. The
assumption that adverse pre-trial publicity will lose its impact on a jury
with the passage of time, may no longer be valid. Changes of venue may
no longer work in the way they once did. In a number of proceedings,
which will only grow, the ease of access to adverse information has
arisen in applications for the discharge of a jury or in the context of an
28
appeal against conviction and also in contempt proceedings.
123 The

Hon. J.J. Spigelman AC, Open Justice and the Intemet, Address at The Law Via
the Internet 2003 Conference (Nov. 28, 2003), available at http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au
/sc%5Csc.nsf/pages/spigelman_281103 (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
124
12
126

id.
Id
id.

This particular remark secured headlines in the Australian press. See, e.g., Louise
Milligan, Top Judge says ElectronicAge Risks Right to FairTrial,THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov.
29-30, 2003, at 7.
12' Spigelman Address, supra note 123.
127
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Similar concerns have been expressed elsewhere in relation to "jurors being
able to access portions of proceedings relating to rulings made in their absence" and
transcripts of rape-victim testimony being available on the Internet.'29
Broadcasting and Internet technologies make it possible for a virtually limitless
public audience to view proceedings and access court documents. It may be

interesting to reflect on whether public access via audio-visual broadcast or Internet
posting of civil proceedings and their documents can be justified in terms of the

principles of open justice. 3 ' Will potential exposure to every Internet user in the
world have an impact on the choice of dispute resolution venue, driving disputes
away from the courts and towards alternative dispute resolution proceedings that are
not required to be open to public scrutiny?'
In significantly altering the dissemination of public information, technological
developments certainly appear to be challenging the manner in which public access
has been regulated and also appear to provide the rationale for imposing greater
restraints on reporting that utilises such technologies. Noting difficulties
experienced by courts in the United States "in deciding whether and to what extent
they should provide full access to electronic records,"' 32 Anne Wallace observes
that electronic filing of court documents "will challenge courts to develop policies
that establish a framework for public access to court records in the age of electronic
communication. A central concern of such policies will be to balance the public
right to know what goes on in open court against concerns relating to individual
33
privacy."'
This implication may also explain why courts remain reluctant to turn the right
to report on judicial proceedings that are open to the public into a presumptive right
to record proceedings for broadcast or streaming. Consequently, it may be
appropriate to revisit the current implementation of the principle of open justice or the constitutional rights related to public trials as discerned from the First and
Sixth Amendments.
,29 See Anne Wallace, Technology and the Judiciary: The Use of Technology in the

Criminal Trial Process, Presentation at the Fourth National Outlook Symposium on Crime
in Australia Convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology (June 21-22, 2001),
availableat http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/outlook4fWallace.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2003).
30 For privacy concerns relating to Internet access to court documents, see Chris Puplick,
NSW Privacy Commissioner, Open Justice: Cui Bono?, Address to the Third Australian
Institute of Judicial Administration "Technology for Justice" Conference (Oct. 22, 2002),
available at online at http://www.aija.org.au/tech3/program/presentations/AIJA.doc (last
visited Dec. 20, 2003).
,3, For an outline of the potential of new technologies and a discussion of issues such as

the conflict between access and privacy, see Allison Stanfield, Cyber Courts: Using the
Internet to Assist Court Processes,8 J. LAW & INFO. SCI. 241 (1997).
132 Anne Wallace, Courts On-line: PublicAccess to the Electronic Court Record, 10 J.

JUD. ADMIN. 94, 100 (2000).
,33 Id. at 95.
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Justice Spigelman's warning that "[d]evelopments in technology pose new
challenges to the ability to ensure a fair trial"134 may also be applicable if the focus
on the potential of technology obscures the lack of equality in public access and the
ability to utilise such technology. Thus the Australian Law Reform Commission
has emphasised the need to ensure that utilisation of technology is not at the
expense of those who do not have access to or the skills to use the technology,
noting that "advances in information technology could create a class of people who
35
are 'information poor' as opposed to 'information wealthy.""m
While new technology may create new issues for courts seeking to balance
principles of open justice with competing interests, such as the right to a "fair trial,
privacy or rehabilitation,"' 36 they also offer technological solutions. Thus, Chief
Justice Spigelman pointed to technology's concurrent potential to:
inhibit access in some manner, e.g. by the use of abbreviations or
pseudonyms for a certain period of time, to allow time for appeal. There
may be an electronic equivalent to the spent convictions regime, so that
records of conviction are no longer accessible electronically after a
certain period of time has elapsed.'37
As Anne Wallace has observed, in questioning whether in response to problems
created by electronic access, courts may need to "consider differential access rights
to some material for parties and the public[.] ...[T]he issue is not the technology,
but rather, how we use it."' 38
The arrival of new technologies (and in particular the readily accessible
Internet), and their increasing utilisation by courts, has coincided with reforms
instigated in the 1990s by many governments and courts to enhance public
understanding of their role, facilitate access and scrutiny, redress loss ofconfidence,
and promote informed commentary. Judicial and political reforms also have led
some governments to take steps to open judicial processes to greater scrutiny, to
promote greater public understanding of judicial processes, and to accommodate
newly-imposed rights. Thus, for example, public inquiries into access to justice in
Britain and Australia have led to reforms of the judiciary and to greater focus on

"' Spigelman Address, supra note 123.

13s AusTL. LAw REFORM COMM'N, ISSUES PAPER 23: TEcHNOLOGY -

WHAT IT MEANS

FOR FEDERAL DISPrE RESOLUTION ch. 5.30 (1998), availableat
http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulother/alrc/publications/issues/23/ALRCEP23.hUnW
Dec. 20, 2003).
136 Spigelman Address, supra note 123.
137 Id.
138 See Wallace,

supra note 129.

(last visited
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public access, efficiency and transparency." 9 In part due to the devolution of the
United Kingdom, Scottish courts and authorities have also embarked on promoting
public understanding of Scottish law. 4 '
Many courts have taken steps to promote accurate reporting and informed
commentary and criticism by, for example, providing the media with
judgment/opinion summaries or posting such on court Web sites. Thus, the Web
pages of most courts are now used to provide a wide range of informative material
for the public.'' Canadian courts such as those ofBritish Columbia have developed
interesting and innovative materials accessible to the public via the Internet.'
Even the U.S. Supreme Court appears prepared to make audio transcripts of
proceedings more readily available.'43
Perhaps most significantly, Internet technology and its utilisation by courts
worldwide has provided an acceptable means for courts, reluctant to permit
television cameras to record and broadcast proceedings, to make audio-visual
recordings of proceedings available to the public. As a result, some courts, such as
the Federal Court of Australia, have begun to stream and archive audio-visual
footage.'4 4
The Internet has removed the need for courts to rely entirely on the media for
any publicity and in particular for audio-visual publicity. With the aid of this
technology, courts have the means to facilitate public access to courts and court
"' See LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, DEP'TFOR CONST. AFF.,RESOLVING AND AVOIDING

DISPUTES INTHE INFO. AGE (1998), at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consul/ itstrat/civindex.htm

(last visited Dec. 20, 2003);

RONALD SACKVILLE, AccEsS TO JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM.,

ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN ACTION PLAN (1994); LORD WOOLF, DEP'T FOR CONST. AFF.,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT (1996), at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm

(last visited Feb. 20,2004). See generally Justice Ronald Sackville, Access to Justice- The
Way Forward, Keynote Address at Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Annual
Conference (July 13, 2002), available at
http://www.aija.org.au/acO2/Sackvile.rtf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
140 On Scottish devolution, see Stephen Tierney, Constitutionalisingthe Role of the Judge:
Scotland and the New Order, 5 THE EDINBURGH L. REv. 49-72 (2001).
The Australian High Court of Appeals has posted all reported and unreported cases on
its Web site. See Aust. Legal Info. Inst., High Court of Australia, at http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/cases/cthfHCA/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
"4 B.C. Courthouse Library Soc'y Home Page, athttp://www.bccls.bc.ca/index.cfin (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
143 See Aho, supra note 89.
IU See Federal Court of Australia, Video Archives of Judgment Summaries, at
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/judgmtsLvideo01 .html (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
It is perhaps worth underlining that unlike comparable overseas jurisdictions, Australians
have free access to the case law and statutes of all jurisdictions; see Aust. Legal Info. Inst.,
athttp://www.austlii.edu.au/ (lastvisited Dec. 20,2003), and that even transcripts ofall High
Court hearings and decisions are freely and promptly available on the Internet. See supra
note 141.
'4'

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:791

proceedings and to promote public understanding of the role of our courts. By
permitting courts to post audio-visual footage of proceedings on the World Wide
Web inexpensively, public access to audio-visual recording of court proceedings
need no longer depend on media interest.
The Internet medium appears to provide courts with a readily available means
of overcoming concerns that many courts have had with electronic media coverage;
recall that those concerns include the electronic media's selectivity in what
proceedings are broadcast,' 45 the possibility that the media presence may disrupt
proceedings, and the potential for media broadcasts to distort, misrepresent and
sensationalise proceedings through editing and commentary. " Significantly, it also
places the means of overcoming these obstacles in the hands of the courts.
An illustration of how Internet technology has helped overcome judicial
reservations regarding electronic media coverage is provided by the courts of
Mississippi, which together with those of South Dakota were, prior to 200 1, the
only U.S. state courts still completely closed to camera coverage. 47 The
Mississippi Supreme Court began to record and post footage of legal argument on
the World Wide Web and to allow media networks to access and broadcast video
and audio recorded by the court in 2001.' 41 It is also interesting to note that
although six of the seven justices of Australia's High Court are said to be staunchly
opposed to television coverage of their proceedings, the Court is upgrading its
audio-visual facilities and equipment and considering Web casting its own
149
proceedings.

Increasingjudicial awareness ofthe importance ofpublicising the role and work
of the courts has also caused many courts to take steps to assist media reporting.
Such assistance has included the provision ofjudgment summaries, media briefings,
access to courts recordings or recording equipment, the establishment of
bench/press committees and the provision of information regarding the law and
judicial procedures.
14' The

media's apparent unwillingness to provide extended coverage of legally
significant, though not necessarily newsworthy, cases is documented in Canadian
experiments and in New Zealand's experience. See ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF
COURTS, supra note 45.
146 For further discussion, see Daniel Stepniak & Paul Mason, Court in the Web, 25
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 71, 73-74 (2000).

"4 Radio-Television News Directors' Association & Foundation, at
http://www.rtnda.org/foUsce.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2003). The South Dakota Supreme
Court opened to cameras on an experimental basis in July 2001; the policy became
permanent July 1,2003. S.D. CODIFIED LAwS §§ 15-24 comm'n note (2003).
14' See Cameras in the Courtroom, Panel Discussion Hosted by The Mississippi
Associated Press Broadcasters Association (June 28,2003), at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/
news/default.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).

14' The innovations and success of the streaming of Australia's Federal Parliament
provides a fine model. See Parliament of Australia, at http://www.aph.gov.au/Live/
webcast2.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
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Vi. CONCLUSION
Even this brief overview of the utilisation by the media of audio-visual
recording equipment in reporting court proceedings and consideration of some of
the implications reveals why many courts in common law countries remain reluctant
to embrace media recording and broadcast of court proceedings. It has also
revealed that many courts' recognition of the need to promote public understanding
of and access to records of judicial proceedings has made them more sympathetic
and accommodating of media needs. Undoubtedly, courts utilisation of audio-visual
technology to enhance the efficiency of administration and proceedings has led
many courts to acquire a greater appreciation of what audio-visual coverage and
recordings of court proceedings can accomplish that mere press reporting cannot.
New technology, in particular the Internet, appears to provide courts with viable
means of addressing the long-standing concerns regarding the media's audio-visual
coverage of court proceedings, and of securing the balance between the rights to a
fair trial and those of the open and public administration of justice.

